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PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH RIGHTS FALL PREY TO AN
EMERGING DOCTRINAL FORMALISM
Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes*
Long live formalism. It is what makes a government a govern-
ment of laws and not of men.'
Despite this toast from Justice Scalia in 1997, formalism's use in constitutional
discourse had waned considerably in the decades since the New Deal. The pre-New
Deal Court's formalism preference, evident in its rule-based categorical distinctions
between "commerce" and "manufacture,"2 or between the separate spheres of the
police power and unconstitutional infringements on liberty,3 had been replaced by
formalism's antithesis, a more standard-like balancing, in much of constitutional doc-
trine.4 Indeed, at the time of his formalism tribute, Justice Scalia was one of only two
committed formalists on the Court (although two other Justices demonstrated varied
levels of formalistic leanings).5
But with the arrival of two new Justices during the October 2005 Term, formalism
may indeed rise again to leave its mark on certain aspects of constitutional doctrine.
Although it is obviously too early to draw firm conclusions, as Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito sat together on only thirty-six cases in their last Term, statistical
analyses of the Term show a high level of agreement between the new Justices.6 In
* Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. I am extremely grateful for
the outstanding research assistance provided by Andy Torrant, the financial support granted
by South Texas College of Law, and the helpful comments of David Guinn, Randy Kelso, and
Marcie Rhodes.
' Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in AMATTER OFINTERPRETATION:
FEDERALCOURTS AND THELAW 3, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-
Law Courts].
2 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-17 (1895).
3 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
4 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALEL.J.
943, 964-72 (1987).
5 See CHARLES D. KELSO & R. RANDALL KELSO, THE PATH OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 13.4 (forthcoming 2007) (on file with author).
6 See, e.g., REBECCA CADY, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR. SUPREME COURT INST., SU-
PREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: OCTOBER TERM 2005 OVERVIEW 2-3, 9-10 (2006),
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/sci/documents/GULCSupCtlnstituteFinalReport
OT2005_30JuneO6.pdf; Peter B. Rutledge, Looking Ahead: October Term 2006, 2005-2006
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 361, 366-67, available at http://www.catostore.org/pdfs/pdf001_scr-
2005-chapt.pdf.
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addition, these same studies revealed that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
frequently agreed with the Court's two committed formalists, Justices Scalia and
Thomas.7 These four Justices, combined with Justice Kennedy, who often adheres to
formalism's precepts in certain doctrinal areas, may end up ensuring that formalism
is indeed a long-lived jurisprudential methodology, particularly in free speech, federal-
ism, and some constitutional criminal procedure decisions.
One illustration from the October 2005 Term is Garcetti v. Ceballos.' Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito, held that public employees' speech "pursuant to their official
duties" merits no constitutional protection at all from employer discipline, irrespective
of the speech's importance.9 This dispositive categorization of on-the-job speech as
either "official duty" speech or "unofficial" speech' is representative of formal juris-
tic reasoning, viewing the judiciary's role as merely analytically ascertaining the
appropriate classification that then establishes whether any constitutional protection
is to be afforded.
In this Article, I highlight Garcetti's formalism and its implications. In Part I,
I provide a short overview of formalism, discussing its vices and virtues. " Part II then
relates prior public employee speech jurisprudence as a contrast to the formalistic
approach employed in Garcetti.'2 I next discuss the difficulties of Garcetti' s approach
in Part 1m, concluding that the Court's use of rule-based adjudication in this particular
context indicates a misguided preference for formalism.' 3 I conclude in Part IV by
considering the extent to which Garcetti and other recent decisions signify the begin-
ning of a modem era of constitutional formalism. 4
I. A PRIMER ON FORMALISM
My references to "formalism" in this Article describe aj urisprudential philosophy
that depends on an analytic methodology to formulate categorical rules from back-
ground policies that then govern future controversies. Formalism is both analytic and
positivist in that it combines "a focus on certain, predictable treatment of existing
positive law with an insistence on logical rule application."'" Thus, a formalist prefers
rules over standards-and the more clear-cut the rule, the better.
7 See Rutledge, supra note 6, at 366-67.
8 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
9 Id. at 1960.
'o See id. at 1960-61.
" See infra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 30-152 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 153-210 and accompanying text.
"' See infra notes 211-21 and accompanying text.
'5 KELSO & KELSO, supra note 5, § 3.1.
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The formalist's predilection for rules is perceived to be advantageous in ensuring
predictability, uniformity, and transparency, as well as in limiting future judicial dis-
cretion.'6 These benefits arise because the given rule's application to a particular
situation is supposed to be an analytical (or, to some, even a mechanical) process. 7
When initially formulated, the rule should encapsulate the underlying policies in such
a manner that allows the rule to act independently in future applications. 8 The rule
thereafter governs exclusively, even when the result obtained does not serve the origi-
nal underlying policies that supported the rule's formulation. The formalist believes
any such over- and under-inclusiveness inherent in the rule is outweighed by pro-
viding a transparent methodology for reaching judicial holdings predictable to actors
in advance of their conduct.' 9
Modem constitutional formalists also praise the capacity of rules to constrain
judicial discretion.2" Rules require the judiciary to maintain a limited role, without
expressing "political or policy preferences" best left to the other branches of govern-
ment. 2 Avoiding the appearance of policymaking, it is contended, assists in preserv-
ing judicial legitimacy, ensuring that the Court exercises legaljudgment, not disguised
politics.22 Modem constitutional formalism is accordingly sometimes described as
"democratic formalism" because one of its overarching purposes is "to ensure that
judgments are made by those with a superior democratic pedigree."23
Not everyone is enamored with formalism, of course. Many contend that its
advantages are illusory at best. While principles of judicial restraint may be served
by interpreting constitutional provisions as "very specific, rule-like prohibitions,"
such "rules cannot be judicially extended or modified to adapt to everchanging
situations."24 This difficulty is compounded because a court framing a rule decides
a particular case or controversy with limited ability to predict how its decision will
impact future cases.25 Rules are based on generalizations, which are all invalid to
16 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REv. 22, 57-58 (1992).
" Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781, 793-95
(1989).
" Sullivan, supra note 16, at 58.
'9 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175,
1177-79 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, The Rule of Law].
20 See id. at 1178-80.
21 Id. at 1179.
22 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 987-91,999-1001 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that "undue burden" standard
was created through political judicial activism).
23 Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 530
(1997) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA ET AL., A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW (1997)) (emphasis omitted).
24 Larry Alexander, Constitutional Theory and Constitutionally Optional Benefits and
Burdens, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 287, 311-12 (1994).
23 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
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some degree, so "perfect justice can only be achieved if courts are unconstrained
by such imperfect generalizations. '"26
The formalist's rules, then, have both advantages and disadvantages. No "sen-
sible person" should thus suppose, as Judge Posner remarked, "that rules are always
superior to standards, or vice versa.' 27 Even committed formalists like Justice Scalia
admit a flexible standard is sometimes necessary.28
Formalists, however, demonstrate a meta-preference for adopting rules as a nor-
mative choice, even when the employment of a standard may be more beneficial under
the particular circumstances. A formalist typically defaults to a rule, eschewing an
evaluation of the relative advantages and disadvantages of a standard in that situation,
unless no workable rule is apparent. Such a commitment to employing rules for the
sake of rules whenever possible is sometimes troubling, especially when the adopted
rules do not work properly. A vague rule in one of the innumerable areas in which
the query is a matter of degree invites arbitrary decision-making and ultimate failure.29
This may indeed be the fate of the Garcetti distinction between "official duty" speech
and "unofficial" speech developed in contravention of the Court's prior public em-
ployee speech jurisprudence.
II. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH RIGHTS FROM PICKERING TO GARCETFI
Justice Holmes famously remarked during his statejudicial tenure that a police-
man "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman."3° This viewpoint expressed the unchallenged dogma of that
era-a public employee had no basis to object to restrictions placed on the exercise
of constitutional rights as a condition of employment. Over time, however, a new
vision emerged.
A. The Initial Pillars: Pickering and Connick
Constitutional protection for public employee speech originated in Pickering
v. Board of Education.3 Under its reasoning, public employees do not surrender
609 & n.140 (1992).
26 Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 19, at 1177.
27 MindGames, Inc. v. W. Publ'g Co., Inc., 218 F.3d 652,657 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1126 (2001).
28 Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 19, at 1187.
29 Cf. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 541 (1948) ("[T]he eternal problem of the law is one
of making accommodations between conflicting interests. This is why most legal problems
end as questions of degree.").
30 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
3' 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Before Pickering, the Court had protected public employees'
associational rights under the First Amendment in a series of cases challenging loyalty oaths.
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their precious First Amendment rights by virtue of government employment, even
though the State's interests as an employer "differ significantly from those it pos-
sesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. 32 As
a result, the judiciary should "arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public
employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the in-
terest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees."33
This balance at first was ad hoc and fact dependent. Pickering explained that
only "general lines" should be articulated for analyzing the competing interests as it
was neither "appropriate [n]or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard. 34
The Court examined several considerations that it determined were controlling in
Pickering, including the impact of the speech on working relationships, the harm
caused by the speech, the public's interest in the speech, and the employee's relation-
ship to that issue. 35 The Court first reasoned that the school teacher's letter to the
editor, which blasted the school board both for allocating excessive funds to athletic
programs and for muting criticism of its proposals, was not directed toward a col-
league and thus did not compromise close working relationships.36 Moreover, no
evidence existed that the letter was actually detrimental or caused any public outcry.37
On the other hand, the letter addressed a legitimate matter of public concern within
the expertise of teachers, the most likely members of the community "to have in-
formed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools
should be spent. '38 Because such expertise was "vital to informed decision-making
by the electorate, 39 the Court held in favor of the teacher, concluding that "the in-
terest of the school administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute
to public debate [was] not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar
contribution by any member of the general public."'
This broad balancing standard continued to govern the Court's evaluation of
public employee speech claims over the next fifteen years. Based on its holding in
See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub.
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1961). In Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142-44 (1983),
the Court explicitly acknowledged that Pickering evolved from these earlier cases.
32 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 569.
31 See id. at 570-72. The Court cautioned that other factors might be controlling in other
situations, due to "the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements by
teachers and other public employees may be thought by their superiors, against whom the
statements are directed, to furnish grounds for dismissal." Id. at 569.
36 Id. at 569-70.
17 Id. at 570-71.
" Id. at 571-72.
39 Id. at 572.
40 Id. at 573.
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Pickering, the Court concluded in Perry v. Sindermann 4 that a junior college pro-
fessor's criticisms of the Board of Regents in his capacity as president of the Texas
Junior College Teachers Association was not a permissible basis for his dismissal.42
Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle43 subsequently
outlined a burden-shifting scheme for analyzing whether a public school teacher's
termination was predicated on his protected public speech belittling the political
motivations behind the school board's implementation of a dress code. 44 In Givhan
v. Western Line Consolidated School District,4 5 the Court explained that free speech
protection under Pickering was not lost when public employees "communicate[d]
privately with [their] employer[s]" instead of spreading their views publicly.46 In
all these decisions, the Court adhered to the relatively ad hoc balancing considerations
announced in Pickering, merely providing additional guidance on their application
under the circumstances presented.
In Connick v. Myers,47 however, the Court remolded the Pickering balance to
require a public concern analysis as a prerequisite to weighing the individual and
governmental interests at stake.4 8 After being informed she would be transferred to
a different division, Myers, an assistant district attorney in New Orleans, prepared
a questionnaire soliciting the views of co-workers concerning the office's transfer
4' 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
42 Id. at 594-98. Because the district court had granted summary judgment to the Regents
without the "full exploration" of the free speech issue, the Court remanded the case for con-
sideration of whether his dismissal was in fact predicated on his exercise of protected First
Amendment rights. Id. at 598.
4' 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
44 Id. at 281-87. Because Pickering's constitutional protection "is sufficiently vindicated
if such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct,"
the Court reasoned that the employee must first show that his constitutionally protected conduct
was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action before the burden
shifts to the employer to demonstrate that it would have undertaken the same action "in the
absence of the protected conduct." Id. at 285-87. Because the lower courts had not applied
this standard, the case was remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 287.
4' 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
46 Id. at 415-16. Bessie Givhan, ajunior high schoolteacher, was dismissed after complain-
ing to her principal regarding school employment policies and practices that she believed
were racially discriminatory. Id. at 412-13. The district court ordered her reinstatement after
a bench trial, finding that her dismissal violated her First Amendment rights. Id. at 413. Yet
the court of appeals reversed solely on the ground "'that private expression by a public em-
ployee is not constitutionally protected."' Id. (quoting Ayers v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist.,
555 F.2d 1309, 1318 (5th Cir. 1977)). The Supreme Court, though, disagreed that private em-
ployee speech fell entirely outside the ambit of the First Amendment, although it recognized
"the Pickering balance... may involve different considerations in private expression," espe-
cially as a result of the threat to an "employing agency's institutional efficiency" during con-
frontations with an immediate supervisor. Id. at 415 & n.4.
4' 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
48 Id. at 146.
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policy, morale, confidence in supervisors, and other similar matters.49 Upon distrib-
uting this questionnaire to fifteen other attorneys, she was fired for insubordination.5 °
The Court viewed the Pickering right as limited to a public employee's comments
"'as a citizen'" on "'matters of public concern, '"51 reasoning that this limitation
"reflect[ed] both the historical evolvement of the rights of public employees, and the
common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employ-
ment decision became a constitutional matter."52 The Court accordingly determined
that if the questionnaire did not constitute "speech on a matter of public concern,"
the district attorney's office had carte blanche to manage its office without judicial
oversight.53 The Court envisioned its role as "merely ensur[ing] that citizens are not
deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government; this does
not require a grant of immunity for employee grievances not afforded by the First
Amendment to those who do not work for the State."54
The public concern query, the Court continued, depended on "the content, form,
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. 55 Employing this
analysis, the Court determined that Myers's questions regarding office morale, the
need for a grievance committee, and her co-workers' trust in their supervisors were
mere "employee grievances" not entitled to any constitutional protection from disci-
plinary actions.56 According to the majority, the only limited matter of public concern
was whether the district attorney's office pressured its employees to participate in
political campaigns.57 But this "limited First Amendment interest" did not require
the district attorney to "tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt
the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relationships. 58
The Pickering ad hoc guidelines thus evolved into a multi-step tiered balancing
standard after Connick. First, only public employee speech "as a citizen" regarding
"matters of public concern" had any possibility of protection from employer disci-
pline.59 Assuming the employee's speech satisfied this requirement, the next step
consisted of balancing the state's interests in providing efficient governmental ser-
vices against the individual and public interests in the speech at issue.' If the speech
49 Id. at 140-41.
'o Id. at 141.
I' d. at 143 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
52 Id. (citations omitted).
5 Id. at 146.
54 Id. at 147.
'5 Id. at 147-48 (citation omitted).
56 Id. at 147.
17 Id. at 148-49.
58 Id. at 154. The Court cautioned, however, that a greater showing of actual disruption
would be necessary if the speech addressed a more pressing issue of public concern. See id.
at 152.
'9 Id. at 147.
6 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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was protected, the final inquiry was whether the speech was the basis for the adverse
employment action, which allowed the government to attempt to establish that it would
have undertaken the same action irrespective of the employee's protected speech.6
One issue the Court had not resolved, however, was the meaning of its statement
that the speech had to be "as a citizen." The lower courts soon tackled this issue on
their own and developed a consistent governing legal standard, even though the in-
determinancy of a standard occasionally led to conflicting results.
B. Lower Courts and Job-Related Speech
Almost contemporaneously with Connick, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc,
considered whether speech related to governmental employment duties could be pro-
tected from retaliatory discipline under Pickering.62 Although the court determined
that expression related to "peculiarly internal matters of governmental employment"
was not ipso facto outside First Amendment protection, the court cautioned that the
nature of such communications was nevertheless highly relevant to the Pickering bal-
ance. 63 Speech related to "the substantive work to be performed," the Seventh Circuit
reasoned, implicated the state's capacity as an employer to evaluate the employee's
job performance, and frequently fell outside the ambit of the public's interest.' Under
this presumption, plaintiffs frequently lost cases in which their comments were made
as part of their job, though a variety of rationales were employed depending on the
facts and circumstances of the particular case.
1. A Matter of Public Concern
The initial hurdle for plaintiffs whose expression related to their employment
duties was establishing that their speech embraced a matter of public concern.65 As
Connick explained, protected speech must address a "matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community," whereas speech "as an employee upon matters only
of personal interest" was not protected from an employer's ire.66 In those instances
in which the discourse was only of personal concern to the employee, or was merely
an employment gripe, the government prevailed.
61 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977).
62 Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 316-23 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 918 (1983), overruled inpart on other grounds by Feit v. Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 851-56
(7th Cir. 1989). Connick was released slightly before Egger. See id. at 294 n.*. Although the
Seventh Circuit did not revise its opinion to incorporate Connick's holding, Egger noted that
Connick "provides additional support for our decision." Id.
63 Id. at 316.
64 Id.
65 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983).
66 Id.
1180
2007] PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH RIGHTS FALL PREY TO FORMALISM
For example, criticisms of co-workers' office misbehavior or their personal habits
or traits,67 personal disputes with superiors,' disciplinary actions meted out by supe-
riors to subordinates,69 and complaints about staffing, promotions, salaries, and other
employment policies7° were not typically considered to be matters of public concern
by the courts. Such cases differentiated the classic "employee beef' from those re-
marks enriching the public's repository of knowledge regarding governmental opera-
tions." The key was whether the expression was made primarily in the speaker's
capacity as an employee or as a citizen. Speech as an employee, being preoccupied
with the employee's own circumstances, was not a matter of public concern, whereas
speech as a citizen, addressing the functioning of the government on a broader civic
basis, was.
72
This same focus on the primary purpose of the expression was also apparent in
decisions considering a public employee's internal written or oral reports made pur-
suant to his or her official job duties. A standard memo or other writing that was a
routine requirement of the job was not typically deemed commentary by citizens on
matters of public concern under the Connick analysis.73 Courts usually reached a
67 See, e.g., Barnes v. Small, 840 F.2d 972,982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding employee's
discharge for writing letters alleging misbehavior by other office employees did not violate
his free speech rights); Egger, 710 F.2d at 317.
68 See, e.g., Sparr v. Ward, 306 F.3d 589,594-95 (8th Cir. 2002) (concluding employee's
claims of harassment against a superior were not a matter of public concern when the charges
predominantly appeared concerned with protecting her position); Gillum v. City of Kerrville,
3 F.3d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding police officer's complaints regarding his role in an
internal investigation of his police chief were not protected from retaliation), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1072 (1994).
69 See, e.g., Holland v. Rimmer, 25 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (4th Cir. 1994) (determining
agency director's discipline of subordinates was not a matter of public concern).
70 See, e.g., Tuttle v. Mo. Dep't of Agric., 172 F.3d 1025, 1034 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding
employee's speech to superior about how company cutbacks would affect workers in his
position did not satisfy the public concern requirement), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 877 (1999).
71 See, e.g., Murray v. Gardner, 741 F.2d 434, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1050 (1985).
72 Cf Sparr, 306 F.3d at 594-95 (concluding employee's memorandum was primarily
motivated by concerns regarding protecting herjob in course of disagreement with her super-
visor rather than an expression of public concern about alleged harassment and mismanage-
ment); Gillum, 3 F.3d at 121 (holding that although a violation of the law by a police chief
was an issue of public concern, the police officer's dispute with his superiors predominantly
concerned his role in an ongoing investigation); Terrell v. Univ. of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d
1360, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that a police captain's personal notebook with criti-
cisms of his chief during a governmental investigation regarding the captain's harassment and
favoritism in dealing with lower level employees merely constituted speech as part of a
personal employment dispute rather than as a citizen on a matter of public concern), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1064 (1987).
73 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. City of Chicago, 239 F.3d 939, 941 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
investigator's daily reports regarding police misconduct not speech "'as a citizen' on a matter
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similar result for written reports specifically requested by a supervisor,74 oral con-
versations pursuant to specific supervisor approval,75 or written correspondence that
appeared to articulate the employer's viewpoint.76 Due to the government's power
to disseminate its own message when spending public funds to promote its policies,
it could generally regulate the speech of its employees performing specifically as-
signed tasks.77 Under the Connick content/form/context analysis, such speech was in
the form of a routine report, the content was specified or authorized by the employer,
and the speech was made in the context of the employee's typical job duties.78 Thus,
in these cases, the employee was "acting entirely in an employment capacity" as he
or she could have been fired for not speaking.79
Yet only expression the court determined to be "purely job-related," without
any type of public motivation, and made internally as required by official job duties,
came within this prohibition. 80 Even though the "rote, routine discharge of an as-
signed duty" typically was not a matter of public concern," the courts viewed this
as a guideline rather than a prophylactic rule. 2 Simply because an employee's job
of public concern"); Morris v. Crow, 142 F.3d 1379, 1382 (11 th Cir. 1998) (concluding acci-
dent investigator's report regarding traffic accident prepared under his "official and customary
duties" was not citizen speech); Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1447 (10th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (holding allegations as to cause of a fire were not a matter of public concern
when the "report did not 'sufficiently inform the issue as to be helpful to the public' (quoting
Wilson v. City of Littleton, 732 F.2d 765, 768 (10th Cir. 1984))), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909
(1988); Cahill v. O'Donnell, 75 F. Supp. 2d 264,273 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (determining that the
fact that Internal Affairs employees' speech was made in course of "day-to-day professional
obligations" weighed strongly against characterizing their speech as on a matter of public
concern).
7' E.g., Buazard v. Meridith, 172 F.3d 546,548-49 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding reports written
by assistant chief of police at direction of his superior regarding the firings of two officers
were an expression of a police officer rather than a concerned citizen).
" See, e.g., Thomson v. Scheid, 977 F.2d 1017, 1021 (6th Cir. 1992) (concluding inves-
tigator's oral discussions with his superiors about office procedures before he contacted fed-
eral officials with his supervisor's approval were not citizen speech), cert. denied, 508 U.S.
910 (1993).
76 See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Pittsburg Indep. Sch. Dist., 207 F.3d 814, 817-18 (5th Cir. 2000)
(relying on fact that memos from principal to school board were on school letterhead and signed
in principal's official capacity to support conclusion that her speech was not protected); Youker
v. Schoenenberger, 22 F.3d 163, 166-67 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that letter signed with
stamped signature of employee's boss was not protected speech when it was deemed to repre-
sent official position of tax assessor's office rather than employee's own views).
77 See, e.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 416 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding state could limit
access to lewd materials on computers it owned).
78 Gonzalez, 239 F.3d at 941.
'9 Id. at 941-42.
80 See, e.g., Buazard v. Meridith, 172 F.3d 546, 548-49 (8th Cir. 1999).
8 Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511, 519 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 925 (2004).
82 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 239 F.3d at 941-42; Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d
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responsibilities might partially "overlap with motivations of a well-meaning citizen"
did not preclude the existence of citizen speech. 3 When the employee attempted
to expose improper occurrences discovered while performing official duties,84 pre-
pared reports voluntarily regarding issues of civic concerS5 or otherwise attempted
to sufficiently inform an issue in order to assist the public in evaluating governmen-
tal conduct,86 the employee's speech met the public concern standard.
Such lower court decisions appeared to be supported by Connick. Connick's pub-
lic concern analysis highlighted that Myers's questionnaire did not inform the
community that the district attorney's office was not satisfying its obligations, bring
to the public's attention any "wrongdoing or breach of public trust," or attempt to
otherwise evaluate the district attorney's performance "as an elected official.""
These gaps appeared to be the key in Connick, not an exclusive focus on whether
the expression was made in the scope of official duties. Indeed, in an earlier case
in an analogous context, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a governmental em-
ployee's comments may be expressed simultaneously in both an employment and
1275, 1292 (1 th Cir. 2000); Morris v. Crow, 142 F.3d 1379, 1382 (11 th Cir. 1998); Cahill v.
O'Donnell, 75 F. Supp. 2d 264, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
83 Delgado, 282 F.3d at 519.
84 See, e.g., Gonzalez, 239 F.3d at 941 (reasoning in dictum that investigator would have
First Amendment right to expose a police cover-up because doing so "would be acting beyond
his employment capacity"); Cahill, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (suggesting that bringing to the
public's attention a cover-up or institutional problems would be protected speech).
85 See, e.g., Morris, 142 F.3d at 1382 (opining that voluntary reports of public employees
may constitute citizen speech); Hulbert v. Wilhelm, 120 F.3d 648, 653-54 (7th Cir. 1997)
(protecting a county land management administrator's reports regarding wrongdoing in other
government departments).
86 See, e.g., Branton v. City of Dallas, 272 F.3d 730,740-41 (5th Cir. 2001) (determining
an Internal Affairs officer's statements to an assistant city manager regarding alleged dis-
honest testimony of another police officer at a disciplinary hearing were matters of public
concern despite the fact her position required her to report false testimony at official hear-
ings); Oladeinde, 230 F.3d at 1292 (holding observations made in course of work as police
officer involved matters of public concern when the officer's purpose was to illuminate pos-
sible governmental wrongdoing); Lee v. Nicholl, 197 F.3d 1291, 1295 (10th Cir. 1999) (con-
cluding memo discussing traffic safety at a particular intersection authored by a highway
department employee sufficiently informed the issue as to constitute a matter of public con-
cern); Warnock v. Pecos County, 116 F.3d 776,780-81 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding auditor, like
other employees hired to make disinterested criticism of government, did not lose First Amend-
ment protection when addressing a matter of public interest when his speech was discretion-
ary and primarily made as an interested citizen); Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d
389, 396-97 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding city engineer performing assigned work duty of advising
board of alderman on construction and development projects was nevertheless speaking on
a matter of public concern when he was not merely conveying information on behalf of
others, but was articulating his own personal beliefs regarding wasteful expenditures and the
potential dangers from the structural inadequacies of an ongoing dam project), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1166 (1996).
87 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
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citizen capacity.88 Thus, expressive activities within an employee's responsibilities
still constituted a form of protected "political" speech when primarily designed to
advocate governmental reform, criticize governmental policies, or otherwise inform
the community on civic matters.
This approach is exemplified by the contrast between Morris v. Crow 89 and Taylor
v. Keith.90 Morris held that an accident investigator's report regarding a traffic acci-
dent was not speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern when prepared under
his "official and customary duties."9 The court reasoned that there was nothing in
the record demonstrating that the investigator intended to expose any wrongdoing
or do anything else other than his job of accurately reporting the accident's cause. 92
On the other hand, Taylor involved a police officer asserting in a written report and
in oral comments to a supervisor that a fellow officer appeared to have a penchant for
employing excessive force.93 His comments involved more than merely performing
his own job duties-he was also trying to protect the community at large from a po-
tentially rogue officer. Thus, his report incorporated protected statements made as
a citizen on a matter of public concern.94
Although this standard was fact-dependent and not always predictable, it served
the value of providing employees that reported governmental corruption or wrong-
doing discovered in the course of their employment duties some protection from
retaliation. On the other side of the balance, because the employee's speech only
merited safeguarding when the employee was intending to inform the public dis-
course, the government still had the leeway to conduct an efficient operation and dis-
miss incessant whiners and needlers. In addition, the government could also still
transfer, discipline, or terminate whistleblowing employees under the balancing prong
when necessary for effective governmental functioning.
2. The Pickering Balance
If the employee cleared the public concern hurdle, the analysis proceeded to
balance the state's interest in promoting efficient public services against the public
and employee's interests in the speech.9 In job-related speech claims, the employer
frequently possessed several potential weighty interests that were often dispositive.
88 See City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n,
429 U.S. 167, 176 n. 1 (1976) (noting teacher addressing an open board of education meeting
"spoke both as an employee and a citizen exercising First Amendment rights").
89 142 F.3d 1379.
90 338 F.3d 639 (6th Cir. 2003).
"' Morris, 142 F.3d at 1382.
92 Id.
93 Taylor, 338 F.3d at 645-46.
94 id.
9' Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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All employers, including public employers, must assess the quality of their em-
ployees' job performance.96 When employee performance is inadequate, employers
need to take corrective action for the good of the institution. Thus, if the employee's
speech indicated his incompetence or unfitness for the assigned work responsibili-
ties, the government employer's interest in efficiently providing services to the public
routinely outweighed the expressive rights at issue.97 As one illustration, when a fire
marshal submitted an arson report that omitted some standard analyses that contra-
dicted his stated opinions, this suggested he was either incompetent or untrustworthy,
both of which constituted strong grounds for dismissal.98
In other situations, the employee's expression incorporated insubordinate, dis-
ruptive conduct providing a basis for discipline. For example, when a police officer
refused a superior's demand to provide him with further information regarding an
investigation before taking the matter to the district attorney, the insubordinate dis-
ruption to the efficient operation of law enforcement efforts outweighed the officer's
free speech interest. 99 Although employees had the right to speak out against their
public employers' activities, employees did not have the right to refuse to cooperate
or perform assigned, lawful duties in protest."
Likewise, employees lost free speech protection when they caused actual dis-
ruption to their office's efficient operations. Although criticism of an institution must
typically be tolerated, criticism of co-workers with whom the employee had a close
working relationship often generated the type of friction that the employer would be
authorized to snuff out despite the employee's expressive rights.10' In some circum-
stances, the very manner of the speech established its disruptiveness. For instance,
a security guard's comments at a maximum security prison regarding insufficient
security personnel addressed a matter of public concern, yet her profanity-laced out-
burst regarding the security shortage in front of prisoners as the evening meal began
96 Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1450 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1983) (en
banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by Feit v.
Ward, 886 F.2d 848, 851-56 (7th Cir. 1989).
97 Egger, 710 F.2d at 317-18.
98 See Koch, 847 F.2d at 1450 (finding an official fire marshal report that omitted laboratory
analysis suggesting possible accidental cause of the fire rather than concluding arson as opined
in report was speech illustrative of either incompetence or untrustworthiness).
99 Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1293-94 (1 1th Cir. 2000); accord
Berry v. Bailey, 726 F.2d 670,676 (1 lth Cir. 1984) (holding deputy sheriff's refusal to dismiss
charges against politically connected citizens was not protected speech because such state-
ments "took place on the job and concerned Berry's performance of his official duties" and
"threaten[ed] office discipline and harmony in the day-to-day close working relationships
with immediate superiors necessary for efficient office functioning").
" See Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
10' Koch, 847 F.2d at 1451-52.
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was not only disruptive but potentially endangered both staff and inmates. °2 In such
cases, the employer's interest clearly exceeded the relevant free speech interests.
Policy-making or other high-ranking government employees had even less of a
shield. An inverse relationship existed, according to the Supreme Court, between the
level of the employee's authority or public contact and the constitutional protection
afforded to his or her statements. 0 3 For similar reasons authorizing politically moti-
vated terminations of public officials either formulating or providing advice on policy
matters, 104 government employers retained substantial discretion in personnel de-
cisions based on the speech of high-ranking employees. 0 5 The government's strong
interest in the allegiance of high-level subordinates necessary to the efficient pro-
vision of governmental services typically trumped the expressive rights of the em-
ployee and the public. °6
Under the predominant standard before Garcetti, then, employees had a number
of hurdles to overcome before triumphing on a retaliation claim for job-required or
102 Cygan v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 388 F.3d 1092, 1101 (7th Cir. 2004).
'03 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1987). In Rankin, a data entry clerk in
the constable's office, in the course of a discussion with her co-worker boyfriend on Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan's policies on the day he had been shot, remarked that "if they go for him
again, I hope they get him." Id. at 380-81. In finding her speech protected by the First Amend-
ment, the Court reasoned that, in cases where "an employee serves no confidential, policy-
making, or public contact role, the danger to the agency's successful functioning from that
employee's private speech is minimal." Id. at 390-91.
'o4 See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507,517-18 (1980) (concluding patronage dismis-
sals authorized for employees for whom "party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for
the effective performance of the public office involved"); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347,
367-68 (1976) (Brennan, J., plurality) (holding patronage dismissals unconstitutional, but
recognizing that patronage dismissals of policy-making positions could be permissible to
insure the political loyalty of employees).
'05 See Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 981-82 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 944 (2000).
'06 See, e.g., Pool v. VanRheen, 297 F.3d 899, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting govern-
ment's interest in preventing disruption is "magnified" for criticisms by a high ranking em-
ployee, such as a law enforcement commander reporting only to the sheriff); Bonds, 207 F.3d
at 981-82 (holding governmental efficiency and workplace harmony interests authorized
rescinding an offer to employee for a policy-making position based on his critical public
comments regarding his prior governmental employer); Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154,
164-65 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding lottery unit head could be terminated for refusing direct order
to publicly support changes to lottery because of strong governmental interest in allegiance
of high-level subordinates), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 823 (1999); Moran v. Washington, 147
F.3d 839, 849-50 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding deputy commissioner's responsibility to
develop and implement community outreach program weighed against her free speech rights
to denounce plan); Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988,994 (5th Cir. 1992) (en
banc) (Barksdale, J., plurality) (noting that policy-making or confidential employees' First
Amendment rights are more easily outweighed in the Pickering balance), cert. denied, 504
U.S. 941 (1992).
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employment-related speech. While employees might clear some of these obstacles,
they infrequently were able to surmount all of them and prevail on their claim. Vic-
torious plaintiffs typically engaged in classic "whistle-blowing activities" in which
a lower ranking employee established that he or she was disciplined for bringing to
light public improprieties discovered and published as part of his or her job duties.1°7
In these situations, the courts often reasoned that the key aspect of any "as a citizen"
requirement was whether the employee was motivated partially by a purpose to expose
governmental faults rather than merely personal concerns regarding either working
conditions or routine performance ofjob duties.10 8 A potential drawback, however,
was that in most of these cases the employer could not prevail on a motion for sum-
mary judgment or a motion to dismiss, especially in cases in which the purpose of the
speech was uncertain or the extent of any disruption controverted.109 But it seemed
that the fundamental democratic value of expression at least tolerated such costs to
ensure that true political speech, even when made on the job, was not silenced. Or
at least that was the common understanding before Garcetti.
C. Garcetti v. Ceballos
Garcetti rejected any First Amendment protection from employer discipline for
speech made pursuant to an employee's official duties. "0 Eschewing the prevailing
balancing standard governing such claims, the Court adopted a new categorical rule
banning any constitutional safeguards."'
The underlying dispute arose when Richard Ceballos, a deputy district attorney
in Los Angeles County, was denied a promotion and reassigned to another position
107 See, e.g., Feldman v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 43 F.3d 823,829-31 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding
housing authority's internal audit director's detailed reports regarding governmental waste,
inefficiency, and criminal activity required by his job responsibilities were protected speech);
Rookard v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding nursing director's
discharge for performing her duty to complain to inspector general about corrupt nursing prac-
tices at municipal hospital violated her constitutional rights).
108 See, e.g., Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 599 (6th Cir. 2003); Guilloty Perez v.
Pierluisi, 339 F.3d 43, 51-54 (1st Cir. 2003); Taylor v. Keith, 338 F.3d 639, 644-46 (6th Cir.
2003); Baldassare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d 188, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2001); Dill v. City of Edmond,
155 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998). While Baldassare reasoned that its focus on the moti-
vation of the employee and the value of the speech erased any distinction between an emplo-
yee's expression "as an employee" or "as a citizen," 250 F.3d at 197, its result could also be
defended under the same rationale employed by the other circuits.
109 See, e.g., Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543
U.S. 813 (2004); Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 600-02; Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511, 517 (7th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 925 (2004); Branton v. City of Dallas, 272 F.3d 730, 741
(5th Cir. 2001); Echtenkamp v. Loudon County Pub. Sch., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1058 n. 11
(E.D. Va. 2003).
110 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
"'. Id. at 1961.
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in a different courthouse shortly after authoring a memorandum and testifying in a
pending criminal case that an affidavit supporting a search warrant contained critical
misrepresentations. 12 A defense attorney had requested that Ceballos review the
questionable affidavit, which Ceballos agreed to do. " 3 After undertaking his inves-
tigation, Ceballos told his supervisors that the affidavit included false and misleading
statements, and he prepared a disposition memorandum recommending dismissing
the case. 14 A meeting followed between the district attorney's office and the sheriff s
department, which "allegedly became heated" as law enforcement personnel questioned
Ceballos's conclusions."' Ceballos's superiors subsequently elected to proceed with
the prosecution. 6 During a preliminary hearing, the defense called Ceballos as a
witness, but, despite his testimony, the trial court overruled the defense's challenge
to the warrant. 1 7 Thereafter, Ceballos claimed he endured retaliatory employment
practices, which he alleged violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 18
The district court dismissed Ceballos's claims on summary judgment based on
various immunity grounds, but the court of appeals reversed." 9 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that Ceballos' s disposition memorandum was "inherently a matter of public
concern" when it was intended to expose wrongdoing and misconduct by other
governmental employees.' The mere fact that the memorandum was written in
furtherance of Ceballos' s employment duties was not dispositive, the appellate court
determined, when his whistle-blowing activities were "important to the orderly func-
tioning of the democratic process.""12
But according to the Supreme Court, the "controlling factor" was indeed that
Ceballos's "expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy."' 22
In such situations, "when public employees make statements pursuant to their offi-
cial duties," the Court held that "the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline."' 23
112 Id. at 1955-56.
"1 Id. at 1955.
114 Id. at 1955-56.




"' Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1951.
120 Id. at 1174.
121 Id. at 1175-77. Judge O'Scannlain concurred specially, agreeing that prior Ninth
Circuit precedent compelled the result, but urging that the court's prior cases protecting
routine, required, and job-related expression were erroneous. Id. at 1185 (O'Scannlain, J.,
concurring).
122 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1959-60.
123 Id. at 1960.
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The Court's proffered rationales for this new prophylactic rule were somewhat
wanting. The Court first discounted any possibility that "official duty" speech could
be made both as part of the job and as a citizen on a matter of public concern-the
personal motivation of Ceballos was deemed irrelevant since "[w]hen he went to work
and performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a government
employee."' 24 Because his speech owed its existence to his daily professional re-
sponsibilities and activities, the Court reasoned the district attorney's office had ab-
solute discretion to discipline him based on his speech's content. 25 Yet this reasoning
cannot be reconciled with City of Madison Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission,26 which was ignored by the majority despite
Justice Souter's protest. in that case, the Court had explained that speech could
be made "both as an employee and a citizen exercising First Amendment rights,"'128
a view incompatible with Garcetti's rigid categorization scheme between citizen
speech and official duty speech.
The Court next opined that its result comported with its prior precedents' empha-
sis on the "societal value of employee speech," as employees still retained potential
protection for "contributions to the civic discourse."' 29 This suggests that the policy
supporting governmental employee speech rights is satisfied when employees have
the opportunity to participate in public debate. However, this suggestion is severely
under-inclusive in light of the Court's prior decisions. Although the Court had occa-
sionally highlighted the loss to the public dialogue if governmental employee speech
was silenced, 130 the Court had never before held that public discourse was a necessary
prerequisite for constitutional protection. Quite the contrary, the Court had pre-
viously protected employee speech made exclusively within the confines of the gov-
ernmental office,' 3' and Garcetti indicated that such precedents still controlled. 3 2
Thus, the Court's doctrine established a broader public policy supporting employee
free speech rights apart from merely "participating in public debate."'133
In a similar vein, the Court constructed a false analogy to the extent it urged its
result was consistent with the underpinning theory of granting similar protections
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
127 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1964-65 (Souter, J., dissenting).
128 Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8, 429 U.S. at 176 n. 11.
129 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
130 See, e.g., City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam); Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968).
131 See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1987); Givhan v. W. Line
Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979).
132 Garceni, 126 S. Ct. at 1959 ("That Ceballos expressed his views inside the office, rather
than publicly, is not dispositive.").
133 Id. at 1960.
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to public employee speech and non-public employee speech.13 ' The Court speculated
that public employees making statements outside the scope of their official duties are
granted First Amendment protection because that is the same kind of conduct en-
gaged in by private citizens, although no similar "relevant analogue" to non-public
employees exists when public employees speak pursuant to their employment duties. 1
35
But a critical difference always exists between any speech of a public employee and
a private employee. If I was to be misguided enough to write a letter to the editor of
the local newspaper with inflammatory accusations against my private law school
employer similar to the letter Pickering authored, the First Amendment would not
protect my job. While I certainly could not be censured by the government for my
letter, I could be fired by my employer without implicating the Constitution, as the
required state action would be absent. '36 In contrast, the First Amendment protected
Pickering both from censorship and from retaliatory discipline by his public em-
ployer.'37 Thus, from a constitutional perspective, the protection public employees
enjoy from employer retaliation for their speech is never analogous to private citizen
speech. As a result, any comparison between public and non-public employee con-
stitutional speech rights is perilous-the government simply does not "constitution-
ally have the complete freedom of action enjoyed by a private employer."' 38
The Court also highlighted "the powerful network of legislative enactments-
such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes-available to those who seek
to expose wrongdoing."' 39 But the scope of the First Amendment should not be lim-
ited merely because some state and federal statutes-subject to repeal or amend-
ment- may afford similar protection. " And in any event, as Justice Souter's dissent
established, the various state and federal whistle-blower provisions create merely a
"patchwork" protection rather than a robust, generally applicable public employee
speech guarantee similar to the First Amendment.' 4'
Thus, most of the Court's purported "rationales" for its decision are easily dis-
missed as either inconsistent with prior precedent or overstated. Two remain that are
more substantial. First, the Court emphasized the heightened interests of employers
in regulating an employee's work speech to ensure the efficient promotion of the
public mission.'42 Second, the Court indicated that judicial intervention to balance
134 Id. at 1960-61.
3 Id. at 1961.
136 See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-17 (1883). While it is possible I might
have some contractual or statutory protection (just as public employees sometimes have), the
United States Constitution would offer no refuge.
131 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-73 (1968).
138 Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 897-98 (1961).
139 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962.
"4 See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 680 (1996).
141 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1970-71 (Souter, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 1960 (majority opinion).
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the competing governmental and individual interests was "inconsistent with sound
principles of federalism and the separation of powers."' 43
Employers do retain a heightened interest in regulating expression related to
internal matters of governmental employment to ensure accuracy, efficientjob per-
formance, and a collegial, productive work environment. Indeed, these strong gov-
ernmental interests had been safeguarded by the lower courts' application of the
Pickering balance for decades before Garcetti.'" As discussed previously, the em-
ployer prevailed in the vast majority of the cases involving expressive commentary
within the employee's professional duties, often as a result of the employer's unique
interests in this context.'45 Thus, there is no disputing the powerful governmental
interests at stake.
But what is disputable is whether these interests required an absolute prophylactic
rule or could instead be accommodated by the balancing standard employed by the
lower courts before Garcetti. In other words, the real issue in Garcetti was not
whether the government possesses a vital interest in employee speech made as part
of the job-there is no dispute that it does-but whether that interest should bar any
possibility of free speech rights instead of continuing to be an often dispositive factor
in the balancing equation. The conflicting opinions in Garcetti can thus be synopsized
in terms of whether a rule or standard is more appropriate in this situation.
The majority indicated that its rule was preferable under federalism and separation
of powers principles. 146 The Court opined that the judiciary would be intruding on
the state, local, and federal executive spheres through "oversight of communications
between and among government employees and their superiors in the course of offi-
cial business." 147 According to the Court, the appropriate level of deference neces-
sitated judicial non-intervention in the daily conduct of governmental operations. ' 48
Yet curiously, the Court indicated that such deference was not warranted regard-
ing public employers' descriptions of an employee's duties. 149 Although the Court
refused to announce a framework for defining the scope of an employee's occupa-
tional responsibilities, it rejected any suggestion that employers can rely on "exces-
sively broad job descriptions" to limit free speech rights. 50 The Court proclaimed
that a listing of a particular task in a formal job description, which often does not
resemble the employee's actual duties, is "neither necessary nor sufficient" to con-
stitute official duty unprotected speech.' 5 ' Instead, the query "is a practical one."' 52
14 Id. at 1961.
'44 See supra Part lI.B.
145 See supra Part II.B.
'46 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961.
147 Id.
148 See id.
"49 Id. at 1961-62.
5 Id. at 1961.
' ' Id. at 1962.
152 Id. at 1961.
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By entrusting the underlying classification to a "practical" judicial query,
however, the Court undercut the stated advantages to its prophylactic rule. While
the virtues of rule-based adjudication were thus abridged, the Court nevertheless
adhered to a categorical distinction. Favoring such a rule, even when its advantages
were not apparent under the circumstances, is the hallmark of formalism.
111. GARCETTI'S MISGUIDED FORMALISM
The individualized circumstances surrounding a particular case sometimes favor
adopting a rule and sometimes support announcing a standard. Rules are preferable
when the decision must be applied by numerous actors facing common or frequent
situations, predictable future outcomes are critical, the court has the necessary infor-
mation to produce a workable rule, and the rule may assist the judiciary from suc-
cumbing to political pressure.'53 On the other hand, rules may be hazardous when
these circumstances do not exist, especially when the court lacks the necessary infor-
mation to produce a workable rule that will ensure predictability in future decisions.I"
The desirability of the categorical rule adopted in Garcetti is not apparent under
these case-by-case factors. Rather, these criteria indicate that the preferable course
of action would have been to retain the standard the lower courts had been follow-
ing for decades, while perhaps re-emphasizing the importance of the government's
interest in this particular context.
A. The Infinite Variety of Public Employee Speech Cases
Public employee speech cases defy simple rule-based categorization because of
the almost limitless circumstances in which they arise. As Pickering cautioned, rules
are unavailing as there are an "enormous variety of fact situations in which critical
statements by teachers and other public employees may be thought by their superiors,
against whom the statements are directed, to furnish grounds for dismissal."' 55 The
Supreme Court's decisions since that time have only confirmed the prescience of
this original caution. The Court has addressed employee speech rights arising from
writing and publishing a letter to the editor,'56 orally providing the substance of an
internal school memorandum to a local radio station,'57 privately complaining of racial
discrimination to a superior,' preparing an internal office questionnaire regarding
employee morale, 59 expressing to a co-worker hope for a successful presidential
"' See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1899, 1913 (2006).
114 See id.
155 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968).
156 Id. at 569-72.
117 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 281-87 (1977).
158 Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412-16 (1979).
9 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141-49 (1983).
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assassination, 160 accepting honoraria for articles and speaking engagements, 6' and
selling sexually explicit videotapes on eBay.
162
And that is merely a slice from those cases that reached the pinnacle of the
judicial system, without even mentioning the hundreds of other situations confronted
in the lower federal courts over the last forty years. A sampling of only a handful of
these decisions from the last three years include a college basketball coach fired for
complaining about social opportunities for his players in Arkansas during a press
conference discussing recruiting,16 a public school teacher terminated for belonging
to a group advocating sexual relationships between men and boys,' 14 university stu-
dents and teachers barred from contacting prospective athletes regarding a school
mascot controversy, 65 and police officers and fire fighters discharged for entering a
racist parade float mocking African Americans."6 Such an endless variety of scenarios
precludes any contention that these cases involve "common" situations. Instead, there
is a need for flexibility to account properly for the vast disparities in these cases.
The Court would likely respond that it did not attempt to adopt a rule for all these
situations but merely for those cases in which the employee's expression is made
as part of his or her professional duties. Yet the difficulty here is that this category
may still be exceedingly broad. Indeed, a relatively expansive interpretation has been
favored so far by two circuit courts. These courts held that a borough manager was
acting within the scope of his official duties when he relayed employee complaints
to the borough council, 167 and that an on-duty, uniformed police officer was within
her professional responsibilities when telling her superiors after a meeting that she
disagreed with the police chief's plan. 68 Thus, the Court's rule still might cover a
myriad of circumstances.
I say "might cover" advisedly, which segues into another problem with the
Court's rule-it has not truly assisted predictability. Although the result may be
predictable in cases in which it is undisputed that the speech was made pursuant to
the employee's official duties, the Court has merely shifted the uncertainty to the
scope of the underlying categorization. Rather than the relatively stable balancing
'6 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380-91 (1987).
161 United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466-72 (1995).
162 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80-82 (2004) (per curiam).
163 Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046, 1062-63 (8th Cir. 2006).
"6 Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 196-99 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1183 (2004).
165 Crue v. Aiken, 370 F.3d 668, 678 (7th Cir. 2004).
'6 Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 178-83 (2d Cir. 2006).
167 Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 242 (3d Cir. 2006).
168 Mills v. City of Evansville, 452 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion just one month later in Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770 (7th
Cir. 2006), holding that the deputy sheriff's duties at issue did not include commenting on the
sheriff s decision to hire a public relations officer, a statement which was made in his capacity
as a union representative. Id. at 774.
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process that had become familiar in these cases, the lower courts are now con-
fronted with an inexact classification prerequisite that is already generating unpre-
dictable results.
B. The Indeterminancy of the Garcetti Rule
The core advantage of rules is predictability. If a rule does not provide predict-
ability, it is not of much value. Although the Garcetti rule superficially promotes
predictability by adopting a categorical prerequisite to the balancing process, its
distinction between "official duty" and non-official public employee speech is not
self-evident.
The Court's discussion offers little illumination. The Court did not even pro-
vide consistent terminology for the classification it was creating. While most of the
Court's references to the classification employed either the terms "official," "pro-
fessional," "employment," "job," or "assigned" to modify either "duties," "responsi-
bilities," "activities," "communications," or "capacity," '169 the Court alternatively
described the category as encompassing an employee's "work product" or commu-
nications between employees "in the course of official business."'7 ° These various
shades indicate different potential meanings, and it is not clear which one the Court
intended, especially because it declined to specify the appropriate framework. In-
stead, the Court merely cautioned that the inquiry "is a practical one" that is not
necessarily controlled by a written job description. 71
But a "practical" query, without any guiding standard, and based on conflicting
underlying policies, does not assist predictability. A hypothetical illustrates the dif-
ficulty. Suppose Agent X is employed by the FBI as an investigator in a special unit
that does not routinely investigate other members of the Bureau. However, Agent
X's observations while performing his job duties make him suspicious that another
agent is engaging in unlawful activity. On his own, he undertakes a preliminary in-
vestigation that confirms his suspicions and then decides that he needs to report the
other agent's activities. Indeed, like all federal employees, he is required to "disclose
waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities."'7 2 Does he have any
First Amendment protection if he does so? Does it depend on whom he informs?
Would he have any protection if he went public? If you were his attorney, what would
you say?
The only honest answer would be, "Gee, X, I have no idea." The first predica-
ment would be to articulate some standard to guide the query before even trying to
answer his questions. At least three very different approaches are feasible.
69 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1955, 1960-62 (2006).
170 Id. at 1960-61.
71 Id. at 1961-62.
172 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(11) (2006).
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The first possibility would be to interpret Garcetti narrowly-in its own terms,
to speech that "the employer itself has commissioned or created."'73 Ceballos had
to prepare a disposition memo in every case recommending how to proceed in
accordance with his duties as a deputy district attorney.'74 If he had not produced
his memorandum, he certainly could have been disciplined. As a result, he likewise
is subject to discipline for the memo's contents. Under this view, though, only speech
that is required by the job would be outside the ambit of the PickeringlConnick
balance.'75 If an employee has discretion whether to make the comments or pursue
the investigation, the Garcetti bar would not apply. Thus, for instance, an athletic
director reporting on his own initiative an investigation about a hazing incident
involving football players would not be speaking pursuant to his "official duties."' 76
Employing this narrow approach, which has been favored by some courts, 77
Agent X probably would not be speaking pursuant to his "official duties" in reporting
his concerns about the other agent. Agent X undertook the investigation on his own
initiative rather than as part of the daily tasks he was to perform in his special unit.
The only remaining issue is the general federal employee duty to disclose "abuse."
Because this is an "excessively broad job description[]" applying to all federal em-
ployees, this regulation might fall within the Court's caution regarding "[flormal job
descriptions" not being controlling.' On the other hand, it is possible that in this
particular instance (as X is an FBI agent), this general duty applies with special force
to him (especially if specific FBI regulations supplement the general command), mak-
ing it a requirement of his job to report any unlawful activity at the risk of termination.
In any event, the resolution of Agent X's claim would depend on his punishment for
not speaking to his superiors.
Although this narrow approach has several advantages, as it comports with
Garcetti's holding (and most pre-Garcetti lower court decisions), offers a relatively
17 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
174 See id.
17 Cf. id. ("When he went to work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform, Cebalos
acted as a government employee. The fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak
or write does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance.").
176 See Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 167 n.3 (2d Cir.
2006) (concluding, while Garcetti was pending, that Garcetti' s holding would not impact the
case as the athletic director's investigation and reports regarding hazing incident were "not
made strictly pursuant to his duties as a public employee"), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 382 (2006).
... See, e.g., id.; Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Ctr., 451 F. Supp. 2d 905,929 (N.D.
Ohio 2006) ("If the public employee's speech was required by his or her job, then Garcetti
applies and the statements are not protected speech. If the speech, however, is not specifically
job-related, then the statements are reviewed under a traditional Connick analysis."); cf.
Kodrea v. City of Kokomo, 458 F. Supp. 2d 857, 868 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (holding fact issue
existed regarding whether supervisor of seasonal employees had an official duty to report
employee misconduct when it was not part of the "core function" of his position).
178 Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961-62.
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definitive standard, and corresponds with Garcetti's employer-created speech ratio-
nale, it may conflict with another concern the Court articulated. The Court feared
committing the judiciary to an "intrusive role" overseeing "communications between
and among government employees and their superiors in the course of official busi-
ness.'179 Due to this concern, other courts have adopted a broader definition, cate-
gorizing any employee expression related to the tasks performed on the job as official
duty speech. 8 °
Under this broad approach, Agent X's report would not be safeguarded by the
First Amendment because it addressed matters that he investigated while he was
employed by the government. It would not matter whether he made the report
privately to his superior or publicly-the speech would be pursuant to his "official
duties" when it concerned his daily investigative tasks.' 8'
While this view would generate a clear holding in Agent X's case, its application
in other contexts would be troublesome, especially considering Garcetti' s reliance
on Givhan. 82 Givhan protected a public school teacher's complaints to her principal
regarding the school's racial discrimination in hiring teachers, 83 which suggests that
teachers act outside theirjob responsibilities when commenting on hiring decisions.
The conflicting results between Agent X's hypothetical case and Givhan depend on
different conceptions of the "practical" inquiry into the daily tasks of the employee
in each situation. The resolution of this query is not always evident. As an illustra-
tion, would it be within the daily duties of a nuclear scientist employed by the govern-
ment to complain about a colleague's handling of radioactive materials?"8 The answer
would depend on the "practical" view as to what a nuclear scientist does, which is not
readily apparent. Thus, this approach would not necessarily assist predictability.
Moreover, this standard is likely too encompassing in light of other aspects of
Garcetti. The Court assumed that if Ceballos had "gone public" with his concerns,
his speech would have received some First Amendment protection. 85 This indicates
that Agent X's report deserves some constitutional protection if made publicly, which
would contravene the expected result under an analysis merely predicated on speech
related to the tasks that the employee performs on a daily basis.
179 Id. at 1961.
180 See Boykin v. City of Baton Rouge, 439 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609-11 (M.D. La. 2006)
(holding diversification report of human resources director was speech within his official duties
even though it was made public).
18' Cf Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
112 Cf id. at 1959.
i83 Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979).
14 See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1968 (Souter, J., dissenting).
185 See id. at 1961 (majority opinion). Additionally, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
did not challenge the assertion in Justice Souter's dissent that the Ninth Circuit on remand
could consider whether other public speech Ceballos made regarding his concerns, such as
a talk to the Mexican-American Bar Association, satisfied the PickeringlConnick standard.
See id. at 1972-73 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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A compromise position between the narrow and broad views might analyze
whether disciplining the employee would silence his or her ability to participate in
public affairs. This approach finds support in the Court's assertion that the "theo-
retical underpinnings" for public employee speech rights hinge upon an "analogue
to speech by citizens who are not government employees."' 86 Such a comparison
would consider whether the employee's speech is similar to non-public employee
expression regarding the government.
187
In Agent X's case, the determination would focus on whether a private citizen
could engage in similar speech reporting observations about an agent's questionable
behavior. A private citizen witnessing an agent's suspicious conduct might inform
the media, his or her legislator, the President, or perhaps a United States Attorney.
So if Agent X makes a similar report to the public, or to an agency or official outside
his chain of command, he will be speaking as a citizen rather than merely as an em-
ployee, implicating First Amendment protections.
On the other hand, if Agent X reports to his immediate supervisor or within his
chain of command, this theory contends he will be communicating as an employee
because citizens who are not government employees do not engage in this type of
speech. But there is an obvious snag here, highlighting the peril in comparing the
disparate speech rights of public employees and private citizens. Isn't it somewhat
likely that a private citizen would indeed make a report of suspicious agent behavior
to the FBI director? Or perhaps to the local FBI supervisor? Because citizens can
make this type of report, shouldn't Agent X likewise be protected if he reports to
the director or his local supervisor? But if that is the case, shouldn't Ceballos's com-
munications to his superiors in his disposition memorandum regarding police mis-
conduct also be protected? Or is the dispositive difference merely a matter of form,
as a citizen could not have written a disposition memorandum, but could have in-
formed higher ranking district attorneys in some other fashion?
Such questions, concerning a fairly routine retaliation scenario, cannot be
answered with certainty, which is supposed to be the very hallmark of formalism.
Agent X has no guidance on how to proceed, much less make an accurate prediction
of the final result. It is not even certain which general approach should be employed,
as all of them have problems and are plagued with uncertainty.
And it only gets worse if we apply the Court's "official duty" categorization to
other situations that have arisen in past cases. What happens if an employee is re-
taliated against for truthfully testifying-as his or herjob requires--during a trial,88
16 Id. at 1961 (majority opinion).
187 Cf. Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528,545-46 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that, while female
correctional officer's complaints regarding inmate sexual harassment to her superiors were
within her job responsibilities, her letters to a state senator and an independent state agency
were outside her official duties because the right to make such complaints was "guaranteed to
any citizen in a democratic society").
18 Cf. Herts v. Smith, 345 F.3d 581 (8th Cir. 2003).
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or perhaps in front of an administrative board?189 Is an employee, who makes a report
of sexual harassment or racial discrimination in accordance with a public employer's
mandatory policy, speaking as an employee or a citizen?' 90 Is a court administrator
who complains internally of a judge denying opportunities to those not working on
the judicial re-election campaign provided any protection by the First Amendment?' 9'
What about a public employee using a grievance committee to air complaints re-
garding politically motivated and allegedly corrupt promotions in the department? 92
How about a public employee reporting a theft to the police, 93 or a county employee
reporting the illegal burning of toxic materials by another county department to the
state? 194
In all of these pre-Garcetti cases, the courts concluded that the employees'
expression addressed a matter of public concern and the analysis proceeded to the
Pickering balance. Now matters are more confused. The prerequisite question of
whether citizen speech is at issue is highly uncertain, even before reaching the bal-
ancing process. Garcetti has merely compounded existing problems, not assisted
predictability. In many cases, public employers' motions for summaryjudgment pred-
icated on Garcetti' s principles are being denied as the courts reason that fact-finding
is necessary to make the practical inquiry it counsels.' 9 This result will only become
more prevalent when the judicial system disposes of the pending cases in which the
plaintiffs admitted or alleged before Garcetti's issuance that their speech was made
pursuant to their official employment duties. 196
Properly formulated rules often do assist predictability. But when the appli-
cation of the rule depends on an underlying categorization that is more ambiguous
than the prior standard, the rule cannot serve its purposes.
89 Cf Robinson v. Balog, 160 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 1998).
190 Cf., e.g., Hensley v. Home, 297 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2002); Wilson v. UT Health Ctr., 973
F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1004 (1993).
191 Cf, e.g., Nunez v. Davis, 169 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1115
(2000); Williams v. Kentucky, 24 F.3d 1526 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 947
(1994).
192 Cf Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1990).
3 Cf Fox v. District of Columbia, 83 F.3d 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
'9 Cf Hulbert v. Wilhelm, 120 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 1997).
195 See, e.g., Barclay v. Michalsky, 451 F. Supp. 2d 386, 395-97 (D. Conn. 2006); Green v.
Barrett, No. 1:04-CV-MHS, 2006 WL 2583291, at *2-3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 8,2006); Marable
v. Nitchman, No. C05-01270MJP, 2006 WL 2572070, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 5, 2006);
Lindsey v. City of Orrick, No. 05-0526-CV-W-DW, 2006 WL 2506461, at *5 (W.D. Mo.
Aug. 29,2006); Falk v. Phillips, No. 4:06CV00506-SWW, 2006 WL 2456130, at *2-3 (E.D.
Ark. Aug. 21, 2006); Batt v. City of Oakland, No. C-02-04975-MHP, 2006 WL 1980401,
at *4-6 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2006).
196 Cf Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2006) (noting Ceballos conceded he
authored his disposition memo pursuant to his employment duties); Hill v. Borough of
Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,242 (3d Cir. 2006) (relying on allegations of borough manager that
he was acting within the scope of his official duties).
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C. Minimal Information for Rule Formulation
The underlying categorization difficulty stems in large measure from the Court's
lack of information to formulate a meaningful topology. A clear, preexisting legal
analogy does not exist to assist in classifying a public employee's speech as either
made within or outside his or her official duties. 9 7 As a result, the Court struggled
to provide any meaningful guidance when a survey of the varied duties of federal and
state officers without briefing on the issue would have stretched the Court's insti-
tutional resources and surpassed its appropriate judicial function.
The Court's restraint in not formulating the underlying standard when the issue
had not been raised in the case is understandable. As the new Chief Justice remarked,
"If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, in my view it is necessary
not to decide more."' 198 Nonetheless, a tension exists between a minimalistic adjudi-
cative philosophy and formalism. A formalist's rules must apply to all, not merely
the litigants before the Court. But in some cases, such as Garcetti, the Court does not
have the resources to establish a framework for applying its rule that will achieve
the benefits of predictability, certainty, and transparency that are the hallmarks of
analytic positivist reasoning. In such situations, the Court should at least consider
the effect its rule would have on previously decided cases to evaluate the likelihood
19 A public employee's official duties are relevant in other areas of the law, but the under-
lying policies are so removed that it is hard to draw a comparison. For example, official
duties are relevant to immunity issues, such as those arising under the federal officer removal
statute, which authorizes federal officers to remove certain state court actions related to the
performance or discharge of their official duties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2000). Although
some potentially relevant case law exists under this statute, see, e.g., Maryland v. Soper (No.
2), 270 U.S. 36, 39-44 (1926) (holding four federal prohibition agents were not in the course
of their official duties when they allegedly testified falsely to the state coroner about a mor-
tally injured man they discovered in the road while they were driving to report an illegal still
to their superior), the policy here is to protect federal officers from state courts by having
official immunity decisions tried in federal court. See Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S.
423, 431 (1999).
In contrast, the prevailing policy articulation for protecting public employee speech
apparently is to safeguard expression that is at the "heart" of the First Amendment-speech
on matters of public concern. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,466-67 (1980); First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). "[S]peech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). Employees should not be deprived of this essential freedom merely
because they work for the government. Instead, "the path of safety lies in the opportunity to
discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969).
198 Cass R. Sunstein, The Minimalist, L.A. TIMEs, May 25, 2006, at B 11 (quoting Chief
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,Commencement Address at Georgetown University Law Center
(May 21, 2006)).
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that benefits from rule-based adjudication may accrue in the future.' 99 Without the
necessary information regarding its impact, the formulation of a rule is hazardous.
The Court became ensnared in this trap in Garcetti. An analysis of earlier public
employee speech decisions reveals their variety and the difficulties the Court's new
classification scheme will cause.2z° The Court should have acknowledged this con-
cern and realized that a rule would do more harm than good, especially because a
rule here is not necessary for judicial independence.
D. Politics and Judicial Restraint
Rules can be beneficial in insulating the judiciary from politics and ensuring
judicial restraint. A rule is frequently envisioned as the product of reasoned judgment
rather than mere judicial will. Due to the analytical or mechanical process in applying
the rule in future cases, judges can maintain that even controversial decisions were
preordained and not a substitution of their desires for the will of the people. Rules
also typically countenance a more limited judicial role in relationship to the demo-
cratically elected branches by providing predictable up-front guidance. Yet these
benefits are not apparent in all cases, including those involving public employee
expressive activity.
Public employee speech cases rarely involve the public controversy prevalent in
other constitutional areas. Instead, such speech usually receives little or no public
attention.2°' And in those few instances when public employee speech has raised the
community's ire, such reaction is frequently a relevant factor in the Pickering balance
due to its impact on the efficient provision of governmental services. For example,
the courts should consider the public's outrage over a school teacher advocating
sexual relationships between men and boys, as this impacts the teacher's effective-
ness in the classroom. 20 2 Likewise, a community's concerns when police officers
publicly lampoon minority citizens affects the department's mission to serve and
protect the entire community.2 3 Rules cannot serve to sequester the judiciary from
such public outcry when these concerns properly inform the analysis.
'99 See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 531 (1990) (noting the Court's "duty, in
deciding [a] case, to consider whether our decision will create litigation and uncertainty" in
other situations that would arise in the future).
200 See supra Part III.B.
201 See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380-91 (1987) (plaintiffs speech in
controversy was made to a sympathetic co-worker in an office with only one other person in
the room); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,570-71 (1968) (plaintiffs opinion letter
to the newspaper received little to no reaction except from the school board that fired him).
202 See Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 196-99 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S.1183 (2004).
203 See Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 178-83 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Even if the judiciary desired insulation from political pressure, Garcetti's rule
does not advance this purpose. Instead, Garcetti removes certain on-the-job speech
from any First Amendment protection. Because such speech made pursuant to work
duties is typically much less likely to receive public attention,204 the Court's rule has
donejust the opposite of establishing a protective judicial shield. Instead, the Court's
rule precludes judicial involvement in those types of cases in which the public is typi-
cally indifferent and inserts the judiciary into more public disputes under a balancing
standard that requires weighing of competing interests.
Garcetti's rule also does not fit within the prototypical judicial restraint model.
The essential premise of judicial restraint is that the power of unelected judges in
a democratic society must be tethered in favor of those persons accountable to the
electorate °.2 5 As a result, the judiciary should tread cautiously when overriding the
decisions of popularly elected officials, whether in the legislative or executive branch.
But many public employee speech cases do not involve popularly elected offi-
cials, especially in those situations in which the employee speaks pursuant to his or
herjob duties. Rather, a governmental bureaucrat or lower-level official is making
at least the initial and often the final disciplinary determination.2 6 Because these
individuals are not subject to electoral accountability, the political process does not
afford a practical remedy.2 7 The judiciary's involvement in these cases simply does
204 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006) (opining its rule did not
prevent public employees from participating in public debate). One exception to this principle
is classroom instruction or academic scholarship by teachers, which more frequently catches
the public's attention. Interestingly, though, Garcetti reserved the question whether its analysis
would also apply to scholarship and teaching. Id. at 1962. Thus, the Court left open the pos-
sibility that the judiciary could be involved in the most contentious realm of on-the-job speech,
which is currently subject to extremely confused governing legal standards. Compare Cockrel
v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1050-52 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding public
school teacher's classroom presentations on industrial hemp, including appearances by Woody
Harrelson, touched on matters of public concern), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 813 (2002), with
Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368-69 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(teacher's classroom speech is within employment duties rather than citizen expression), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 813 (1998), and Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794,
797-800 (5th Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990), and Silano v. Sag Harbor
Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722-23 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying Hazel-
wood standard to teachers' in-class speech rights), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1160 (1995), and
Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448,452-53 (1 st Cir. 1993) (same), and Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs.,
944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991) (same).
205 See MICHAELJ. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (1982).
206 See, e.g., Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1972 & n.14 (Souter, J., dissenting); Kennedy v.
Tangipahoa Parish Library Bd. of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 362-64 (5th Cir. 2000).
207 Although there is a possibility that the electorate will hold an elected official account-
able for the actions of an unelected official subject to his or her control, this occurs in-
frequently and usually only in cases of extreme misconduct or ineptitude rather than when a
whistle-blower is disciplined.
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not interfere with the expressed will of the people to the same extent as invalidating
actions by legislators and policymaking executive officials.
All of this leads to the conclusion that Garcetti adopted a prophylactic rule in a
situation in which the individualized circumstances supporting rule-based adjudication
were missing. In the absence of the case-specific benefits for employing a rule, the
decision can only be justified under a meta-preference for rules over standards. Such
a preference, as discussed previously,2 °8 is associated with the formalistic style of
judicial reasoning, as is Garcetti's underlying categorization scheme.2 9 Garcetti is
thus best understood as a product of formalistic constitutional interpretation.
IV. A MODERN ERA OF CONSTITUTIONAL FORMALISM?
Does Garcetti' s preference for a rule, when case-specific factors favored a stan-
dard, indicate the beginnings of a modem era of constitutional formalism? Obviously,
one case does not signify an era. But hints from the October 2005 Term, as well as
the Justices' earlier writings, portend the emergence of five votes employing formal-
ism' s precepts in certain areas of constitutional discourse.
Justices Scalia and Thomas are committed formalists, indicating a preference
for rules across all aspects of the Court's constitutional doctrine. 21° Both frequently
extol the virtues of rules, especially thejudicial restraint inherent in rule-based adju-
dication.2 1' Both Justices would undoubtedly welcome a new era of constitutional
formalism founded on principles of originalism and restraint.
Although the extent of their conviction is still uncertain, Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito also appear to be attracted to formalism. In the closely divided
opinions from the October 2005 Term, these two Justices frequently joined Justices
Scalia and Thomas in adopting positions consistent with formalism's principles.2 12
208 See supra Part I.
209 See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note 5, § 3.1.
210 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (con-
tending, with Justice Thomas, that the majority's interpretation "ate the rule of law"); Bd. of
County Conm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 711 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining,
in an opinion joined by Justice Thomas, that the Court's holding "subjected... routine prac-
tices to endless, uncertain, case-by-case, balance-all-the-factors-and-who-knows-who-will-
win litigation"); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A
government of laws means a government of rules. Today's decision on the basic issue of
fragmentation of executive power is ungoverned by rule, and hence ungoverned by law.");
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (complaining balancing of competing interests is "like judging whether a particular line
is longer than a particular rock is heavy"). See generally KELSO & KELSO, supra note 5, § 9.4.
211 See Scalia, The Rule of Law, supra note 19, at 1179-80; Clarence Thomas, Judging,
45 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1996).
212 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2810-17 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(urging formalistic textual approach to statutory construction); id. at 2851-55 (Alito, J.,
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Assuming this trend continues, committed formalists will occupy four seats on the
Roberts Court.
Of course, four votes is not enough, as the Four Horsemen discovered during
the New Deal,213 and this potential formalism bloc will need another vote. The most
likely source for the vote on the current Court is Justice Kennedy,214 the author of
Garcetti, who has demonstrated some affinity for formalism in certain areas of consti-
tutional law.215 However, in other doctrinal areas, Justice Kennedy has disavowed
formalism's precepts. 1 6 Thus, Justice Kennedy might be described as a "doctrinal
formalist" who favors formalism when interpreting certain specific constitutional
guarantees.
For example, Justice Kennedy has been particularly enamored of formalism in
the free speech context, Garcetti being merely the most recent of many examples of
Justice Kennedy favoring categorical rules in this area.21 7 State sovereignty and
dissenting) (employing similar formalistic arguments regarding scope of Geneva Conven-
tion); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2678-82 (2006) (holding failure to notify
a foreign national's consulate of arrest does not require suppression under the exclusionary
rule as it was unlikely that the remedial purposes of the rule would be served with any fre-
quency); Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2220-26 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality)
(adopting formalistic perspective on statutory construction issue in the Clean Water Act);
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2198-2202 (2006) (upholding the constitutionality
of all suspicionless searches of parolees); Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2163-68
(2006) (holding exclusionary rule inapplicable to knock-and-announce violations). But see
Jones v. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006) (holding, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts
over the dissent of Justice Thomas, that the circumstances of the particular case must be
examined to ascertain if due process requires additional efforts to inform the property owner
when a tax sale notice is returned unclaimed).
213 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 214-38 (1993) (dis-
cussing the frequent dissents of the Court's four most conservative Justices during the New
Deal era).
214 The departure of one or more Justices on the Court would obviously create a different
dynamic.
215 See KELSO & KELSO, supra note 5, § 12.4.1 (describing Justice Kennedy as a natural law
judge with an affinity for the formalist style of interpretation).
216 See, e.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676, 694-95 (2005)
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (objecting, along with Justice Kennedy, to majority's categorical
bright-line rule prevailing over interest balancing).
217 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S.
431, 465-66 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contending, along with Justice Kennedy, that
all political spending and contribution limits in the course of elections should be subject to
typically fatal strict scrutiny); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,786 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing) (urging that the government is prohibited from "foreclos[ing] a traditional medium of
expression"); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-92 (1992) (holding, in an opinion
joined by Justice Kennedy, that government may not selectively target disfavored messages);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (urging an absolute rule that all content-based restrictions not categorically
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federalism are other doctrinal areas in which Justice Kennedy typically expresses a
formalism preference.2 8 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy's substantive due pro-
cess decisions are often the antithesis of formalism. 219 Thus, it appears that Justice
Kennedy believes that certain clauses of the Constitution countenance a formalistic
perspective, whereas others do not. In those doctrinal areas in which Kennedy's for-
malism preference dovetails with the judicial philosophy of the formalism four, the
Roberts Court may presage a rebirth of at least a limited constitutional formalism that
could be termed "doctrinal formalism."
This doctrinal formalism may even extend to other areas outside Justice
Kennedy's preferences. In certain criminal procedure decisions, Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg have joined Justices Scalia and Thomas in adopting a formal-
istic perspective to vindicate the rights of criminal defendants.220 Although these other
Justices are not themselves committed formalists, they are not opposed to rule-based
adjudication when it comports with their more instrumentalist philosophy.
Formalism may thus indeed be long lived on the Roberts Court, though it will
not be the pre-New Deal Court's pervasive formalism predicated on natural law pre-
cepts. Instead, it appears that a more limited doctrinal formalism in certain contexts
is emerging that formulates rules designed in part to further judicial deference to the
political institution perceived to be in the best position to make the underlying judg-
ment. This emerging doctrinal formalism is evident in Garcetti, which sacrificed the
traditional balancing of public employee speech rights and governmental interests
in favor of a rule which purports to defer to the other governmental institutions. Yet
in adopting this rule, the Garcetti Court unwittingly demonstrated the potential
dangers of formalism's meta-preference for analytical adjudication.
excluded from First Amendment protection violate the Constitution). But see Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 694 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(objecting to "jurisprudence of categories" in majority's public forum analysis).
218 See, e.g., Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 1005-08 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (contending, along with Justice Kennedy, that state sovereign immunity cannot be
abrogated under Congress's Article I powers); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999)
(holding, in an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, that Congress had no Article I power
to subject non-consenting states to suits in state court).
219 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,564-78 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871-79 (1992) (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joint plu-
rality opinion).
220 See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,301-06 (2004); Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004); accord Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal
Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94
GEO. L.J. 183, 184 (2005).
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